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This essay develops new estimates of the size of the underground economy
in the United States, based on an analysis of the household reports of income
and expenditures published annually in the Bureau of Labor Statistics
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES).' Most of the economic literature on the
underground economy has focused on the information-distorting effects that
unreported economic activity has on the National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA)2 and on the macroeconomic models that use this data. This
concern may be misplaced. In recent years the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA), which prepares the national income and product figures, has worked
to incorporate a large part of underground economic activity into the NIPA
totals. A less recognized deficiency is in our household income statistics,
where underreporting of income, along with other factors, has undermined the
validity of one of our most important social indicators: the poverty rate.
t Professor Emeritus of Economics, Portland State University. Ph.D., University of California,
Berkeley. The author has acted as a consultant to the U.S. Bureau of the Census and has published
numerous articles on income distribution and poverty.
1. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. 2333, CONSUMER EXPENDITURE
SURVEY INTEGRATED SURVEY DATA, 1984-86 (1989); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, BULL. 2354, CONSUMER EXPENDITURE SURVEY, 1987 (1990); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. 2383, CONSUMER EXPENDITURE SURVEY, 1988-89 (1991); BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. 2425, CONSUMER EXPENDITURE SURVEY, 1990-91 (1993)
[hereinafter 1990-91 CONSUMER EXPENDITURE SURVEY].
2. In 1991, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) started a comprehensive revision of the NIPA
and replaced gross national product (GNP) with gross domestic product (GDP) as the primary measure of
U.S. production. GDP measures the market value of goods and services produced by labor and property
within the United States; whereas, GNP covers the goods and services produced by labor or property (here
or abroad) supplied by U.S. residents. To move from GDP to GNP, one adds factor income from abroad
(typically interest and dividends) and subtracts payments to foreigners who have claims on income
produced in the United States. Gross national income reflects the incomes generated by the production of
the GNP. Personal income is income received by individuals and nonprofit institutions from both productive
activities and transfer payments (social security, welfare programs, etc.). Personal income less taxes equals
personal disposable income, which also equals personal consumption expenditures plus personal savings.
Conceptually, income should equal output, but since the BEA uses largely independent methods and data
sources to determine aggregate output and total income, there is a small statistical discrepancy each year.
I BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT
ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES M-5 to M-13 (1993) [hereinafter NIPA].
2239
The Yale Law Journal
Before delving into the statistical material that constitutes the core of this
Essay, I will briefly review some conceptual approaches to the underground
economy. Part I presents the economist's view of the underground economy
in contrast to a simple law enforcement approach. Part I, using data from the
CES, examines the reluctance of some households to report income fully (or
at all), compared with their willingness to report expenditures. This comparison
becomes the starting point for new estimates of the underground economy,
covering the years 1984 to 1992. Part I carries forward the analysis of
household income and expenditures by using the individual micro-data
available on public-use tapes,3 rather than the group averages shown in the
published bulletins. Because households are unwilling to report fully, if at all,
the income they receive from underground activity, reported household income
statistics are a deceptive indicator of poverty status; but a dual standard,
employing both income and consumption expenditures, allows us to separate
the truly poor from the phantom poor. Part IV uses the insights gained from
the analysis of income and expenditure data in Part I to reveal the limitations
and defects of the official poverty statistics derived from the Current
Population Reports (CPR).4 Finally, this Essay shows that a few simple
remedial measures could mitigate the distorting effects that unreported income
has on our poverty statistics, and make those statistics more truly
representative of the number of persons actually living below the poverty
thresholds.
3. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CONSUMER EXPENDITURE SURVEY TAPES,
1960-92 [hereinafter CES TAPES]. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) offers for sale computer tapes of
all of the household data collected in the surveys, except for information, such as addresses, that would
reveal the identity of the participants. These tapes offer more information than can be obtained from the
printed bulletins. The data derived from these tapes that are used in this Essay are on file with the author.
4. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P60-186RD, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS: CONSUMER INCOME: MEASURING THE EFFECT OF BENEFITS AND TAXES ON INCOME AND
POVERTY: 1992 (1993) [hereinafter BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MEASURING THE EFFECT].
5. The poverty thresholds refer to a set of minimally adequate incomes sufficient to cover the basic
necessities for households of various sizes and composition. Persons living in households reporting annual
money incomes below these thresholds are classified as poor. The thresholds were constructed in 1963 by
a group in the Social Security Administration. The basic building block of the thresholds was the cost of
a nutritionally adequate diet. Using household budget data, a food-other-necessities-multiplier was
calculated for families of various sizes; these multipliers, applied to the cost of the food basket (the amount
of food, given American tastes, that the National Research Council and the Department of Agriculture have
determined is necessary to meet recommended dietary allowances), were used to estimate nonfood
requirements. Since 1963, the poverty thresholds have been updated each year by applying the BLS
consumer price index (CPI) to the 1963 thresholds. The CPI was supposed to adjust for inflation, but since
the CPI over-indexed inflation in the late 1970's and early 1980's, the poverty thresholds have been raised
slightly in real terms. The effect of this was to increase official poverty-for example, in 1992 from 13.1%
(if the corrected CPI is used) to 14.5%. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MEASURING THE EFFECT, supra note 4,
at xvii tbl. F, 1-10 tbl. 1-4. For an analysis of the poverty thresholds, see chapter one of MORTON PAGLIN,
POVERTY AND TRANSFERS IN-KIND: A RE-EVALUATION OF POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1980).
2240 [Vol. 103: 2239
Paglin
I. THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO THE INFORMAL ECONOMY
The rationale for the law enforcement approach to the underground
economy is straightforward: society through its elected representatives makes
decisions to tax, constrain, or prohibit certain activities; unless these laws are
enforced, there will be an erosion of confidence in the political process and in
the institutions of democratic government. The economic approach, on the
other hand, is less resolute in its condemnation. Laws and activities are
evaluated in terms of economic efficiency and welfare criteria: Are the gains
greater than the losses, so that real output is increased? Are the parties in a
transaction made better off with little or no negative effects on others? Viewed
in these terms, some underground activities can be shown to have net benefits;
whereas, in other cases, particularly the sale of illegal goods, such as drugs,
the detrimental effects predominate. In general, the existence of an
underground activity on a wide scale may be a useful signal that the law is not
effective and should be revised or repealed.
An economic case for justifying underground activities can be stated in
terms similar to those used to justify governmental measures to eliminate
market failures. Markets fail to function efficiently when externalities produce
major divergences between private costs and social costs (the pollution
problem, for example); when collusion among firms results in restricted output
and monopoly rents; and when, because of the difficulty of collective action,
a market economy produces a sub-optimal level of public goods. The
government responds to these market failures by enacting antipollution laws,
pursuing antitrust actions, and providing public goods financed through
taxation and borrowing.
But what remedies do we have when government itself exacerbates market
imperfections by restricting competition through exclusive franchises, raising
farm prices through support programs, imposing regulations that discourage
employment, or maintaining expenditure levels for public goods and
entitlements (with a corresponding level of taxation) that the public deems too
high? An obvious remedy is political action, but given the potency of special
interest groups, change through the legislative process may be slow or not
forthcoming. Another remedy, which requires no political organization, is the
informal market. When laws make markets less efficient by imposing
economic constraints, the informal market, through unrecorded private
transactions, off-the-books employment, and barter, may improve economic
efficiency. However, corrective mechanisms in the underground economy, like
those in the government, have their own failures. Just as government regulatory
agencies that are set up to protect the consumer (such as the Interstate
Commerce Commission) may end up protecting established business interests,
operators in the underground economy, who illegally dump toxic wastes,
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increase market failure by subverting the efforts of government to control
externalities.
The rationale for the more tolerant economic approach can be shown most
strikingly in countries where burdensome laws and regulations cause the
informal economy to become an important economic safety valve. After World
War II, governments in Ghana and other West African countries required all
cocoa farmers to sell their output to the government marketing board ostensibly
to stabilize prices. Instead of passing the revenue on to the farmers, the board
began to skim off an increasingly large margin, leaving many producers with
incomes insufficient to maintain their farms, and eventually resulting in a
decline in the supply of cocoa. Instead of selling all their cocoa to the
government, some farmers resorted to smuggling cocoa across the borders to
take advantage of the higher market price.6 Becoming part of the underground
economy posed risks, but it was the only way some of them felt they could
survive. It was a rational response to a parasitic bureaucracy, and allowed more
income to flow to the producers.
In Italy over the past thirty years, the myriad laws relating to worker
management, taxation, and restrictions on business have led to the growth of
a vigorous and efficient informal sector. In the view of some Italian
economists, this informal sector has kept the economy functioning in the face
of a corrupt, unstable, and poorly managed government.7
In the United States, laws that prohibit the employment of undocumented
aliens have created a large underground garment industry with entry-level jobs
for immigrants with little knowledge of English. Minimum wage, maximum
hour, and rent control legislation has also enlarged the extent of informal
negotiations to circumvent the laws. Though many argue that minimum wage'
and rent control legislation9 protects the public interest, most economists
oppose such laws and regard individual negotiations to get around the
restrictions as beneficial to the parties involved.'0 Raising the minimum wage
6. P.T. BAUER, REALITY AND RHETORIC: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT 14, 98-99
(1984); P.T. Bauer, Marketing Boards, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 329, 330
(John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
7. Bruno Frey, How Large (or Small) Should the Underground Economy Be?, in THE UNDERGROUND
ECONO MS 11, 111 (Edgar L. Feige ed., 1989).
8. A vigorous crackdown on underground employment in the garment trade is demanded in Lora J.
Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the Need for Strengthening Worker
Protective Legislation, 103 YALE LJ. 2179 (1994). I regard such a crackdown as harmful to the workers,
and very likely to leave many without jobs or income. Low-wage garment production, for example, can
easily be shifted abroad.
9. For a succinct expression of the pro-rent-control argument from an active participant in California
legal battles over rent control, see Karl Manheim, Letters to the Editor: Rent Control as a Civic Religion,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 1993, at A23.
10. A recent econometric study again produced the familiar results that an increase in the minimum
wage raises teen-age unemployment JANET CURRIE & BRUCE FALLICK, A NOTE ON THE NEW MINIMUM
WAGE RESEARCH (NAT'L BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH vORKING PAPER NO. 4348, 1993). Liberal
and conservative economists usually agree that minimum wage laws are not an effective way to help the
poor. See, e.g., LESTER C. THURoW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY: DISTRIBUTION AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR
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produces greater unemployment in the ranks of unskilled and inexperienced
workers, while those who keep their jobs are made marginally better off at the
expense of the least advantaged. Economists oppose rent control legislation
because it leads to inefficient use of the housing stock, deterioration and
abandonment of buildings due to poor maintenance, reduction in the supply of
new rental units, and an unfair redistribution of wealth." If rent control
regulations are loosely enforced, landlords will seek to collect something closer
to the market rent, taking payment in cash under the table. This underground
economy in rent-controlled apartments, although illegal, improves economic
efficiency and, arguably, the general welfare.
A very large part of the informal sector is inextricably linked with the
regular economy. The two exist side by side in firms that report most of their
income, or hire mostly legal workers, and in households that report regular
employment income, from which taxes are withheld, but fail to report cash
income from occasional part-time work. Sometimes money derived from the
sale of illegal goods (drugs mostly) is used to purchase and operate legitimate
businesses; in such cases, legal and illegal activities are linked by common
ownership.' 2 For the economist, the central concern is not the source of the
income-whether from legal or illegal activities-but whether it is reported
and included in the national income accounts, in the Census Bureau's
household income surveys, and in the adjusted gross income totals of the IRS.
The accuracy of the statistical data on which policy evaluations and
policymaking depend is threatened when a large amount of income and
economic activity is unreported. Some illegal income is reported to the IRS
under "other income," and some is disguised as legitimate business income,
because a high level of personal expenditure with no declared income makes
one a prime candidate for investigation. But undoubtedly a high percentage of
illegal income is not reported.
Let us now consider two definitions of the underground economy-one
defined broadly in economic terms, the second defined precisely by the IRS
through its legal codes. Each definition has a different emphasis reflecting
different policy concerns. The informal economy is most broadly defined as
ECONOMIC CHANGE 145, 204 (1980); MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE To CHOOSE 237-38
(1980).
Two of the most widely respected texts in urban economics conclude that rent controls damage the
health of the urban economy, produce inefficiencies in the rental housing market, and result in inequitable
wealth transfers. See EDwiN S. MiLLs & BRUCE w. HAMILTON, URBAN ECONOMICS 244-46 (4th ed. 1989);
WERNER Z. HIRSCH, URBAN ECONOMICS 126-33 (1984).
11. It is frequently the long-residing tenant who reaps added cash benefits from rent control by
subletting the apartment at a higher rent, thus deriving income without having made an investment. See
HIRSCH, supra note 11, at 126-33.
12. A study done for the IRS estimated that nine percent of the income from the heroin and cocaine
trade was laundered and reported as legitimate income, but the study may need to be updated. Carol S.
Carson, The Underground Economy: An Introduction, SURV. CURRENT BuS., July 1984, at 107 n.23. Since
taxes were paid on this illegal source income, it no doubt appeared in the NIPA estimates of above-ground
business income.
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all economic activity (market and nonmarket) not recorded in the NIPA.' 3
This definition includes the household sector as a large component of the
underground economy. Why add the value of unpaid housework to the
unreported income from goods produced by illegal aliens? The reason is that
both represent output not reported or fully included in the NIPA. When making
international comparisons, GNP per capita is used as an index of well-being.
Since countries differ sharply in the proportion of women in the paid labor
force, GNP figures are less meaningful if they exclude the household sector.
In the United States, this sector is estimated to be at least 24% of GNP, and
in other countries the percentages vary significantly. 4 Economic historians
study long-term growth rates in GNP; the sizeable shift of women from the
household to the market economy has affected this trend, and GNP growth
rates would be more meaningful for some purposes if we factored in the
decline of the household sector as women shifted to the market sector.
On a related issue, some economists have claimed that the slowdown in
GNP growth rates may be illusory-a spurious statistical artifact-because the
NIPA has not encompassed a growing underground economic sector.'5 In
recent years, however, the BEA has adjusted the NIPA to include unreported
income. For example, IRS tabulations supplied to BEA of incomes reported by
single proprietorships are adjusted upward very significantly on the basis of
IRS sample audits of these businesses. If such imputations are done
extensively, and unpaid housework is valued by using the wages of
housekeepers, nannies, etc., as market analogues, then theoretically most of the
underground economy could be captured and recorded in GNP estimates, and
would therefore disappear according to the first economic definition given
above. Yet underground activity would still be as large as before: imputing
unreported income in the NIPA may satisfy the economist, but it does nothing
to reduce tax evasion and other illegal economic practices.
The legal definition of the underground economy, used by the IRS, is
narrower than the economic definition. Since the law does not impose taxes on
the value of household or other do-it-yourself activities, the IRS can ignore
such nonmarket income; thus, it excludes the output of the household sector
from its measure of the underground economy in order to concentrate on
unreported income from the market sector only. The IRS seeks instead to
13. Unpaid housework has been valued at about 24 to 34% of GNP. J.J. THOMAS, INFOPMAL
ECONOMIC AcrIvrrY 24 (1992). The BEA does not include this nonmarket sector in the national income
accounts, but it does include the imputed rental value of owner-occupied houses in order to insulate GNP
estimates from capricious changes that would result from shifts in the proportion of rental housing to
owner-occupied housing. NIPA, supra note 2.
14. One persuasive argument against including the household sector is the difficulty of estimating the
value of nonmarket activities and the wide variation in the results of the different studies. THOMAS, supra
note 13, at 24-25.
15. Rudy Fichtenbaum, The Productivity Slowdown and the Underground Economy, 28 Q.J. Bus. &
ECON. 78, 78-90 (1989).
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estimate the adjusted gross income (AGI) total that would emerge if all
households correctly reported their income and deductions according to the
income tax codes; this total is then compared to the actual AGI reported by
taxpayers, and the tax loss (tax gap) is calculated by applying the appropriate
tax rates to the missing AGI. For the economist, the IRS tax gap approach is
too narrow, because it misses a substantial segment of the underground
economy. For example, the undocumented worker whose income was below
the filing requirement would not be included in the IRS measure of the
underground economy, yet most other measures would include the income of
low-wage illegal workers.
II. MEASURING THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY USING HOUSEHOLD SURVEY
DATA
The effect of underreported income on our national income accounts has
received the most attention from economists, but underreporting also affects
the household income series in ways that have profound consequences for
economic analysis and social policy, especially in the areas of income
distribution and poverty. This Part examines how underreporting distorts the
household income data; it also considers the benchmarks that can be used to
determine the extent of income concealment, and suggests ways to correct the
distortions induced by underreporting of household income.
Businesses large and small report to the IRS their gross receipts as well
as factor payments (wages, salaries, rents, dividends, interest, and undistributed
profits). While the BEA uses this data to estimate national income and output,
it cannot use it to generate the household income distribution, because each
household may receive many types of income from many sources-wages from
one or more earners, interest and dividends, entrepreneurial profits, etc. Ideally,
the adjusted personal income totals in the national income accounts, which are
based on business reports of income paid out, should correspond with
aggregate income reported by households, but the distribution of household
income can be obtained only from an independent survey of households, such
as the CPS or CES. IRS income tax data has only limited value in this regard
for three reasons: first, not every household must file a return; second, some
households file more than one return (in households with multiple earners,
some file jointly and others separately); and, third, economic and social
analysis of income requires demographic data and other information not found
in IRS tax returns.
This Part analyzes the impact of the underground economy on the validity
of the household income data and the effect that nonreporting and
underreporting of income has on one of our most widely cited social
indicators, the poverty rate, which is the percentage of the population classified
as poor. The household income statistics come from two standard sources: (1)
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the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics annual Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CES), and (2) the Bureau of the Census Current Population Survey (CPS),
which is used to derive our official poverty statistics.
Using the CES data, this Part demonstrates that a household's statement
of both its consumption expenditures and its income can be used to elucidate
the deficiencies in the income-based poverty measure currently in use, and to
generate a new measure of the underground economy. Let us start with the
larger problem of estimating the total amount of missing income due to some
peoples' reluctance to reveal their full incomes. 16 In 1991, 14.2% of the
households in the CES refused to answer questions about the principal source
and amount of their income,17 even though they agreed to answer all
questions relating to expenditures and demographic characteristics. These
"incomplete income reporters," sometimes referred to as zero income reporters,
are segregated from the "complete income reporters,"'" though even the
"complete income reporters" do not necessarily report all their income.
Because the reluctance to disclose information is typically due to concern for
the legal or tax consequences of disclosure, economists generally assume that
the gap between aggregate reported income and reported expenditure, if
income is the smaller figure (as it has been), gives us a first approximation of
the extent of the underground economy.
Now let us examine the data. The CES is based on a national probability
sample of 5000 households. These households are questioned every three
months about their expenditures. In two of these quarters, questions are also
asked about income, and in one of these quarters, questions are also asked
about assets, net worth, and the like.'9 This "Interview Survey" is
supplemented by a "Diary Survey," in which people keep detailed records of
the smaller items purchased-food, household supplies, medicines, etc.-for
a two-week period.20 In recent years, CES has integrated the results of the
16. Individuals are reluctant to reveal income for any number of reasons, for example because: (1) the
income is from illegal activity (drugs, prostitution, gambling, etc.) or from a legal activity carried on in a
way that is illegal-for example, producing a legal good or service with the help of undocumented aliens
or hiring household help whose income is unreported in order to escape the burden of filing and paying
social security taxes; (2) the income is legitimately earned by a self-employed person who evades some
income and social security taxes by requesting payment in cash; (3) the income, if reported, would
jeopardize a work or income-conditioned government transfer payment such as unemployment insurance,
worker's compensation, welfare or food stamps (or alternatively, the transfer payment is not reported); or
(4) the income is earned by someone who is secretive or simply cannot correctly estimate household
income, but willingly provides detailed information on consumption expenditures. Whether income goes
unreported because it is part of the underground economy or because someone is simply mistaken is
irrelevant; in either case, the failure to report distorts information on which theoretical work and policy
analysis are based.
17. See Table 2, infra p. 2251; 1990-91 CONSUMER EXPENDrTURE SURVEY, supra note I, at 14. The
figure 14.2% is derived by dividing the number of "Zero Income Reporters" for 1991 (in the last column
of Table 2) by the "All Households" figure (in the first column), and multiplying by 100.
18. See Table 2, infra p. 2251.
19. 1990-91 CONSUMER EXPENDITURE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 243.
20. Id.
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Interview and the Diary Surveys to obtain something close to complete
coverage of personal consumption expenditures. The CES then "blows up" the
sample results to replicate the approximately one-hundred million households
(or consumer units) in the United States.
In 1991, the CES showed aggregate household expenditures of $2.898
trillion (97.9 million consumer units with a mean expenditure of $29,614).21
What is the appropriate aggregate income to compare with aggregate household
expenditures? The Bureau of Labor Statistics states that, unlike the Census
Bureau, it does not impute income to households who do not report any. But
in effect it does so (at least when it computes aggregate income), because
unlike the expenditure figure shown above, the aggregate income figure given
is based solely on the income of the complete income reporters (eighty-four
million households), blown up to replicate all U.S. households. This method
implies that the households that failed to report income have been assigned an
average income equal to that of the complete income reporters. Hence, the
CES lists the mean income (after taxes) for all 97.9 million households as
$30,729, exactly the same figure shown as the mean of the 84.0 million
households who actually reported income.22
Substantial expenditures by those who report no income suggests
substantial concealed income. Since we wish to estimate that concealed
income, it makes sense to compare the total expenditures reported by all
households in the sample with their total reported income. If we follow this
procedure, we come up with an income total for all households in 1991 of
$2.582 trillion. This total is derived by multiplying the mean after-tax income
of the complete income reporters by the number of such households, eighty-
four million;' the 13.9 million who refused to divulge their incomes add
nothing to the income total but do add to the expenditure total, since they
willingly revealed in detail their purchases of consumer goods. The difference
between the aggregate expenditures and aggregate reported income comes to
$317 billion, which is our first approximation of the size of the underground
economy. However, this figure is too small since it is based on a theoretical
disposable income just sufficient to cover consumer expenditures; consumers
also saved part of their disposable income, 4.8% in 1991.24 Thus, our income
total must account for both expenditures and savings. We accomplish this by
dividing expenditures ($2.897) by (1 minus .048), which yields a theoretically
necessary disposable income of $3.043 trillion. Subtracting our reported
income figure of $2.582 from $3.043 raises the estimate of concealed income
to $461 billion, of which $106 billion (23%) represents the underreporting of
the so-called "complete income reporters" ($106 billion is derived by
21. Id. at 14.
22. Id.
23. See Table 2, infra p. 2251.
24. SURv. CURRENT Bus., Aug. 1993, at 62.
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calculating the income deficit of the zero income reporters and subtracting it
from the total income deficit of $461 billion). This $461 billion estimate of the
underground economy is 9.5% of personal income or 8.1% of GDP. Table 1
gives estimates of the underground economy, for the years 1984 through 1992,
using the procedure described above72 The data in Table 1 indicate that the
underground economy is declining slightly relative to the GDP. The observed
decline may be related to the growth in jobs and employment in the 1980,S.26
25. Table 1, infra p. 2249. The IRS estimated that in 1981 there was unreported income from legal
activities of $249.7 billion plus $34 billion from illegal activities. Richard D. Porter & Amanda S. Bayer,
Monetary Perspective on Underground Economic Activity in the United States, in THE UNDERGROUND
ECONOMIES, supra note 7, at 129. The total ($284 billion) is 9.4% of $3.031 trillion, the GDP for 1981.
For 1987, the IRS estimated a tax loss of $71.2 to $84.9 billion due to nonreported income. I.R.S., U.S.
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. No. 7285, INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH 10 n.3 (1988) [hereinafter
1988 INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH]. A marginal tax rate of 20% generates an unreported AGI of
$365 to $424 billion, or 7.8% to 9.3% of GDP. These percentages, which average 8.6%, are in line with
my estimates of the underground economy (8.5% in 1987), shown in the last column of Table 1. In a recent
study using IRS data, the Department of Labor concluded that the underground economy in 1992 amounted
to $539 billion. GREGORY K, SCHOEPFLE ET" AL., SECRErARIA DEL TRABAJO Y PREVISION SOCIAL DE
MEXICO & U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY IN THE UNITED STATES 24, tbl. 7 (1992).
Since the latest revised GDP for 1992 was $6.038 trillion, this new estimate of the underground economy
equals 8.9% of the above-ground economy-again, a reasonable fit with my series in Table I, which shows
8.1% of GDP for 1992.
26. In 1983 there were 10.7 million unemployed, an unemployment rate of 9.5%; in 1990 this had
dropped to 6.9 million, an unemployment rate of 5.4%; an increase occurred in 1991 to 6.6%, but this
increase was still 31% below the unemployment rate of 1983. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1993, at 393, tbl. 621 (113th ed. 1993)
[hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1993]. As jobs opened up in the formal sector,
some workers shifted out of the underground sector.
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TABLE 1. Estimates of the Underground Economy Derived from Household
Surveys of Income and Expenditures, 1984-199227
Year Unreported Income As a Percent of As a Percent of Gross
(Billions) Personal Income Domestic Product
1984 $387 12.4 10.2
1985 439 13.0 10.9
1986 381 10.8 8.9
1987 386 10.2 8.5
1988 442 10.8 9.0
1989 412 9.4 7.8
1990 462 9.9 8.4
1991 461 9.5 8.1
1992 492 9.6 8.1
One should not conclude from our estimates of underground activity that
the Personal Income or Gross Domestic Product figures of the BEA are too
low by the amounts shown in Table 1. As already noted, the BEA in the past
decade has adjusted its income and output figures upward significantly in order
to capture or record underground activity. However, the BEA excludes illegal
goods such as drugs, prostitution, and loan sharking from the NIPA. The BEA
makes no. formal estimate of the underground economy, but the total of its
adjustments for unreported economic activity and for tax evasion represents its
rough view of the underground economy's dimensions. In 1990, these
adjustments equalled approximately $250 billion.2" This is 54% of the $462
billion shown for that year in Table 1. If these figures are approximately
correct, then GDP is understated by less than 4%.29
27. Table I is derived from data in the Consumer Expenditure Surveys cited supra note 1. Personal
income and GDP figures are from STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES 1993, supra note 26.
In 1986 and subsequent years, BLS used a redesigned sample for the Consumer Expenditure Survey. This
may account in part for the drop between 1985 and 1986. Estimates for 1992 are based on data in BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT 861, CONSUMER EXPENDrrIRES IN 1992, at 6, tbl.
1 (1993). After-tax incomes, not shown in Report 861, were provided by William Passero of BLS. Revised
figures for savings rates, GDP, and personal income for 1991 and 1992 are from SURv. CURRENT BUS.,
Aug. 1993, at 59, 62.
28. Telephone Interview with Robert Parker, Chief of the National Income Division, BEA (Mar. 1,
1994).
29. For information on the BEA's techniques for dealing with the underground economy, see Carson,
supra note 12, and Robert P. Parker, Improved Adjustments for Misreporting of Tax Return Information
Used to Estimate the National Income and Product Accounts, 1977, SURv. CURRENT Bus., June 1984, at
17-25. The BEA's decision to exclude sales of illegal drugs (and other illegal goods) from GDP is, I
believe, justified for three reasons: (1) it is not possible to get reliable data, (2) because they are illegal,
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My estimates closely correspond to the adjusted gross income deficits
revealed by IRS audits of tax returns and by matching studies devised by the
IRS to find the amount of AGI lost through non-filers.30 My estimates are
slightly more inclusive because they include low-income workers who evade
social security taxes. Their incomes do not appear as part of the IRS AGI
figures, because low-income-workers are not required to file or pay income
tax.
The CES data reviewed above show that some households underreport
their income, and, as shown earlier, there are strong economic incentives to do
so. Because most people are forthcoming about every other aspect of the
survey, the failure to report income is probably not simply due to oversight.
Along with questions on expenditures, the surveyor also asks about
contributions to social security and pension plans. Consistently, over the last
ten years of the survey, the "incomplete income reporters" gave very low
figures (I believe truthfully) for such contributions as compared to all other
households who had similar levels of expenditure. In 1991, the complete
income reporters, in the third quintile, whose expenditures averaged about
$25,000 (as did their income), stated that they paid an average of $1,948 into
social security or pensions. In contrast, the zero income reporters (with the
same level of expenditures) stated that they paid an average of only $274.
Since they could have declined to answer, as they did on the income questions,
it is reasonable to assume that they really did pay these small amounts because
most of their income was not reported, and hence escaped both social security
and income taxes. The IRS audits show that a high percentage of the income
underreporters come from the self-employed (whose social security tax rate is
twice that of a company worker), so we can infer that if all their income had
been declared, their contribution would be much more than the $1,948 paid by
the other group, rather than the small amount noted. Finally, it is not likely
that the (near) zero income reporters actually had no income and were using
up their savings, since they reported a greater increase in net worth from the
previous year ($1556) than the average for all other households of $300."'
the street value of drugs is highly inflated relative to true production costs, and (3) GDP per capita is often
used as a measure of economic well-being; it is hard to argue that increased drug sales would add to real
output or well-being, given the enormous negative externalities generated by their use.
30. Both types of evasion are tracked by the IRS in its Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program
(TCMP). For details on the TCMP, see Karla Daronco, Nonfiler Profiles, Processing Year 1991, I.R.S.,
STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN, Summer 1993, at 55; Laura Rosage, Self-Employed Nonfilers, 1988,
I.R.S., STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN, Summer 1993, at 64; 1988 INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH,
supra note 25; I.R.S., PUB. No. 1415, INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH (1990). For a discussion of
how the BEA uses IRS audit data to bring unreported income and output into the NIPA, see Parker, supra
note 29. For a comprehensive review of the BEA's strategy to record unreported income and output and
a response to critics who claim that the BEA is not doing enough, see the two-part article by Carol S.
Carson, The Underground Economy, SURV. CURRENT BUS., May 1984, at 21; July 1984, at 106.
31. 1990-91 CONSUMER EXPENDITURE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 17.
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III. How SHOULD WE MEASURE POVERTY-BY INCoME, CONSUMPTION,
OR BOTH?
Clearly, one major consequence of the underground economy is
underreported and nonreported household income. This makes low reported
income an unreliable indicator of economic welfare because mixed in with the
truly poor are those whose standard of living is far above the poverty level.
This point is shown vividly in Table 2. The poorest quintile of households had
an average after-tax income of $5,648 but an average expenditure level more
than twice that ($13,464). The second income quintile also showed a
significant disparity between consumption expenditures and income. The gap
between income and expenditure would be far more striking if the incomplete
or zero income reporters were put in the lowest quintile. The gap shown in the
table is attributable to two factors: underreporting of income by those who
report some income and the variability of annual income.32 As yet, I have not
been able to determine the size of each group. But when evaluating income as
a measure of poverty status, identifying the two groups is not of crucial
importance-for both groups, reported income gives a false indicator of need.
This suggests the value of a dual measure or test of poverty.
TABLE 2. Average Expenditures by Income Class, 199133
All Complete Poorest Second Third Fourth Richest Zero
Households Income 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% Income
Reporters Reporters
Number of 97,918 84,021 16,757 16,800 16,833 16,789 16,841 13,898
households
Pre-tax income $29,090 $33,901 $5,981 $14,821 $26,073 $40,868 $81,594
Post-tax $26,368 $30,729 $5,648 $14,308 $23,973 $37,237 $72,332
income
Average
annual $29,614 $30,487 $13,464 $18,986 $26,144 $36,151 $57,597 $24,903
expenditures
Average
number of 2.6 2.6 1.8 2.3 2.6 2.9 3.2 2.6
persons in unit
32. Many with higher long-rn average incomes have down years in which they continue to consume
at a high level.
33. Table 2 is derived from data in the 1990-91 CONSUMER EXPENDITURE SURVEY, supra note 1, at
14. Complete income reporters only are classified by quintiles on the basis of pre-tax income. Average
income in the "All Households" column includes the zero income reporters. BLS does not give this figure,
but simply repeats the same average income figure shown in the "Complete Income Reporters" column.
This in a sense imputes income to the zero income reporters equal to the mean income of the complete
reporters. (It should be noted that the complete income reporters may underreport their incomes, and the
zero income reporters may report minor amounts of income.)
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Figure 1 illustrates the effect and greater realism of a two-variable
classification for categorizing rich and poor households.34 Figure 1, which
uses micro-data from the CES Tapes for 1984, shows the contrast between an
income measure of poverty and a consumption measure. Household income
and expenditures have been converted to multiples of the official U.S. poverty
thresholds so that single persons, small families, and large families can be
compared.36 Such a conversion is necessary to make any realistic comparison
of income differences. 1 In Figure 1, income is shown on the horizontal scale
and expenditures on the vertical scale. Households that fall below the income
poverty threshold appear in the left two boxes, while the income-rich occupy
the two boxes on the right. Those who fall below the poverty line in terms of
their consumption expenditures (the consumption-poor) are in the bottom two
boxes. Significantly, although 17.7% of households are income-poor, less than
half of them-only 7.5% of all households-are actually consuming below the
poverty threshold. These households are the truly poor and are shown in the
shaded lower box. However, we must keep in mind that many in this group
receive Medicaid or Medicare, low- or zero-rent public housing units, energy
assistance, free school lunches, and other public subsidies to supplement their
cash consumption expenditures.38
34. Rich here simply means not poor.
35. Expenditures for vehicles have been excluded, so consumption has been slightly understated.
Expenditures excluded purchases of vehicles because BLS considers the entire expenditure made in the year
of purchase even if the vehicle is paid for over several years. This approach is acceptable when calculating
average vehicle expenditures for a large group of households, but it would distort the individual household
data used in our poverty analysis.
36. A family of four with an income-poverty ratio of three is considered to be at the same welfare
level as a two-person household with that ratio because, even though the money income of the four-person
family is considerably higher in dollar terms, both have a real income three times the poverty level.
37. Using per capita household income is another way of doing this, but it is not satisfactory because
it does not take into account the economies of scale in larger households.
38. Food stamps are the only in-kind transfer added to household income in the CONSUMER
EXPENDITURE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 241. No in-kind transfers are included in the income definition used
in the Current Population Survey, our official source of poverty statistics, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P60-184, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: CONSUMER INCOME: MONEY
INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES, AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1992, at ix (1992) [hereinafter
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MONEY INCOME]. "The official income estimates in this report are based solely
on money income before taxes and do not include the value of non-cash benefits such as food stamps,
Medicare, Medicaid, public housing, and employer-provided fringe benefits." Id. For further details on the
income definition used, see id. at C-12. For a critique of the Census Bureau's income concept and a
discussion of the poverty thresholds, see PAGLIN, supra, note 5, chs. 1-2.
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FIGURE 1. Proportion of Households Poor by Income, Consumption, or
Both







Now let us examine the larger segment of the income-poor who are
consumption-rich, the 10.2% of the households shown in the upper left box.
Using the CES Tapes, I have analyzed their consumption expenditures in some
detail, and, surprisingly, many of these income-poor are living exceedingly
well: 13% are spending between four and fifteen times the poverty threshold
income, putting them among the top 20% of the expenditure distribution.
Taking a broader segment, 45% of the income-poor, consumption-rich were
spending between two and fifteen times the poverty level, with the heaviest
concentration at the lower end. In terms of 1992 dollars and poverty thresholds
for a family of four, this would mean an expenditure range of $28,700 to an
exotic $215,000 for the high end (probably a millionaire with losses in that
year). The remaining 55% of the group, while above poverty, had relatively
modest expenditures, between one and two times the poverty thresholds.39 It
is fair to say that the income-poor, consumption-rich make up an unusually
diverse group in terms of their financial assets and their expenditures; most do
not belong in the traditional poverty class. The merit of the dual
consumption-income standard is that it allows us to sort out the people who
are not in need of public aid; it also adds a needed dose of realism to any
discussion of the question of why the United States, a wealthy nation, has such
a large poverty population. The answer, of course, made clearer below, is that,
39. The figures are derived from micro-data on the CES TAPES, supra note 3. The households in the
income-poor, consumption-rich box were classified by their expenditures, which are expressed as multiples
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although we have a poverty problem, a statistical illusion has blown it up to
two or three times its true dimension.
The two boxes on the right require only brief explanation. The one on the
upper right contains 78% of the households: the income-rich, consumption-rich.
They are what they seem; overall, their expenditures reflect their income. The
lower right box (income-rich, consumption-poor) raises some questions. These
households are just 4.3% of all households, but who are they, and why are
they spending at a level below poverty when their incomes would allow for a
more adequate standard of living? Some of these people may be very frugal
or may lead simple lives in farm or country areas and require relatively low
expenditures, perhaps because they raise part of their own food or live in debt-
free houses. Others in this group may be employed as live-in housekeepers or
in institutions that supply some of their food and other needs. In any case,
from a policy perspective, they should not be considered poor because they
have private incomes sufficient to raise their consumption if they wish to do
SO.
Large numbers of the phantom poor-those whose declared incomes are
low (or zero) and whose expenditures are substantial-have as their income
source the underground economy. The easiest way of removing them from
their incongruous designation-short of eliminating the underground
economy-is to adopt a joint income-consumption poverty standard. Because
we commonly perceive poverty in terms of inadequate consumption of the
basic necessities, such a standard would also have theoretical merit. If someone
were supplied with free housing of good quality, adequate food, good medical
care, free education, and legal services, for example, would it matter if her
money income were below the amount required by someone else who had to
purchase all of these necessities? Most people would say no, and that is the
reason why it makes sense to add the consumption criterion to the poverty
standard, or at least to include the value of these consumption goods (called
income in-kind) if we use a single income standard. We must realize, however,
that an income standard, even if the definition is broadened to include income
in-kind, will never be as rigorous as the dual standard as long as we depend
on self-reporting of income in household surveys (and there is no practical
alternative) and have laws that penalize tax evasion and receipt of income from
illegal sources. On the other hand, as we have seen, people tend to be
forthcoming about their consumption expenditures.4"
40. It should be added that the Census Bureau, which conducts the Current Population Survey, assures
people of the confidentiality of the information they give, but the public doubts the firmness of this
assurance.
Some people... don't give the information to the Bureau of the Census because they are afraid
it will get into ... other hands; law enforcement agencies, IRS, et cetera. To the best of my
knowledge, there has never been any disclosure of confidential data by the Census. But some
people still do not want to take any chances.
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IV. IMPROVING OUR OFFICIAL POVERTY STATISTICS
How could we implement the consumption-income poverty standard? One
obvious way would be to use the annual Consumer Expenditure Survey, since
it has both expenditure and income data. But this approach is not practical;
although the CES is large enough to give us national estimates, it is far too
small to give us state poverty figures or the breakdowns we need by age,
ethnicity, and so on. In contrast, the Current Population Survey is more than
ten times as large, a sample of 60,000 households with extensive details on the
composition of households-the number of earners, their educational level,
urban-rural location, family size, and details on income from all sources. Its
principal deficiency (beside its lack of information on expenditures) is its
antiquated definition of income. However, our best hope for improving our
household income statistics and our poverty counts is to change the questions
asked in this large national survey and to find better ways to use the
information now collected, but not used, in estimating the official poverty
figures.
These changes would not be difficult to implement. First, the income
concept should be broadened from the one in use: money income before taxes.
The current definition originated in 1946, when the CPS was inaugurated; at
that time, government in-kind transfers were a negligible component of aid to
the poor, and employer-provided fringe benefits, such as health insurance, were
of minor importance to all income groups. But in 1990, more than $186 billion
in aid to the needy was in the form of in-kind transfers-food stamps, low rent
housing assistance, Medicaid, and the like. These massive antipoverty
programs now constitute 70% of total public aid, and they dwarf cash
assistance programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children
Hearings on the Underground Economy, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 96th
Congress, 1st Sess. 229 (1979) (testimony of Sar A. Levitan). In truth, the IRS has in the past requested
but not received the tapes of households used in the CPS, along with social security numbers, in order to
match tax returns with household reports of income. This method would be effective for estimating the
extent or incidence of tax evasion through nonfiling of returns, a commonly used evasion technique for
small operators in the informal economy. Rosage, supra note 30, at 65. The agencies resolved the problem
of confidentiality of Census data in the following way: The IRS sent to the Census Bureau a tape of tax
returns filed by households that the Bureau identified as members of the 60,000 household sample of the
Current Population Survey. The Census Bureau compared income reported in the CPS to income declared
on the filers' tax returns, using social security numbers as a means of identification. If the Bureau found
that no tax return had been filed by a household whose income required a return, then the Bureau identified
that household as a nonfiler and noted the amount of income not reported. The Bureau then calculated the
number and percentage of nonfiler households and the total of unreported income. It sent these percentages
and totals to the IRS without revealing the identity of the nonfiling households, thus maintaining the
Bureau's pledge of confidentiality. Telephone Interview with Robert Parker, supra note 28; Telephone
Interview with Shi Chiu Ho, Research Division of the Internal Revenue Service (Mar. 1, 1994). This
method, however, may underestimate nonfilers in the underground economy because they may have an
above average nonresponse rate in the Current Population Survey. The IRS, however, has data on other
income sources, which it matches with its master file of social security numbers. See supra note 30.
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(AFDC).4 Yet because of the narrow definition of income, these multi-billion
dollar programs-the fastest growing segment of the budget-are not counted
as part of the income of the poor. So it is not surprising that official poverty
rates in recent years hover near the 14% level. Interestingly, the Census Bureau
now collects the information required for a broader definition of income and
publishes it in separate technical supplements showing poverty rates based on
alternative income concepts. Although there are still gaps to be filled (for
example, estimates of the cash and in-kind transfers not reported by
households), the use of the broadest definition of income dramatically reduces
the poverty rate and indicates that the official poverty rate is overstated by
39% and the number of poor persons, by 10.3 million (1992 figures).42
Why are the improved income concepts not used in making the official
poverty counts? The reasons are mainly political. Large amounts of federal
monies are allocated to states and regions on the basis of the existing poverty
series; politicians fear that reducing the artificially high figures would also
reduce federal funds coming to their states. Other groups who have an interest
in federal poverty programs fear that a lower poverty rate might also reduce
their budgets. On the other hand, the public would feel less cynical about
government programs if they were shown to be effective in reducing poverty.
The improved income concepts recommended here would also help social
scientists to see accurately the effects of transfer programs and economic
growth on the size of the poverty population.
Broadening the income concept to include in-kind transfers brings the 1992
poverty rate down from 14.5% to 10.4%, 43 but it still does nothing to rectify
the underreporting of income. The Census Bureau, which uses benchmarks
from NIPA and government budgetary control totals, shows that CPS income
totals are 88% of the benchmarks. However, only 78% of the published CPS
income comes from household respondents; 22% comes from imputing income
to persons who fail to report; this was done by matching them with other,
demographically similar households who did report their income. This
procedure is basically reasonable, and in the case of government transfer
payments, where the control totals are precise and the income qualifications for
receiving the transfer are also spelled out, even more could be done to correct
for underreporting. But there is also a downside to imputing income to those
who fail to report it, because it results in a household income distribution
partly generated by allocation formulas and judgments by Bureau staff. Still,
such a result is probably better than leaving large amounts of income
41. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1993, supra note 26, at 371, tbl. 583. The total
of public aid for 1990 shown there is $211 billion, but I have excluded educational aid, social services, and
job training funds from my total ($186 billion) because the latter services are not included in the market
basket of goods typically defining the poverty standard.
42. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MEASURING THE EFFECT, supra note 4, at xvii-xix.
43. Id.
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unassigned, and improvements in simulation and imputation techniques should
help the situation over time.
The pattern of underreporting has a distinct relationship to the underground
economy. As expected, households were least forthcoming if the transfer
payments they received were conditioned by work or income limitations. The
amounts reported for unemployment insurance, workers compensation, and
AFDC were only 64%, 66%, and 59%, respectively, of the budgetary control
totals (these percentages do not include imputations, which swell the final
figures).4" As expected, self-reporting of Social Security income was
higher-74% of the actual amount dispersed. Looking at earned income, the
results were also predictable: the self-employed and the single proprietorships,
having the greatest opportunities to operate in the informal economy, also
reported low incomes compared to the benchmarks. The nonfarm
self-employed sector reported 49% of the NIPA benchmark, and the farm
self-employed sector reported 29%. In contrast, reports of wage and salary
earnings totalled 78% of the NIPA benchmark. 45
This underreporting leads me to conclude that it will be difficult to get a
clear picture of the poverty population using income figures alone, though
improved imputation methods will help. But there is a simple remedy for some
of the deficiencies of the income-poverty standard. By adding just two or three
questions to the existing CPS, the poverty statistics could be made far more
realistic, especially where underground income is the problem. For households
reporting incomes below the poverty thresholds, the interviewer could ask (1)
the household's estimated monthly expenditures, and (2) the rental value of the
house or apartment occupied. The interviewer could then ask the respondent
to check one of a few broad intervals of net worth (below $50,000, $50,000
to $100,000, etc.). Since the three variables (rent, expenditures, net worth) are
correlated with income and poverty status, we could, by using simple statistical
cutoffs, determine the truly poor from the phantom poor. For example,
households reporting a very low income but high expenditures, or a net worth
of over $100,000, could be removed from the poverty count. This, along with
other changes discussed above, would significantly improve the quality of our
current poverty statistics and mitigate some of the distortions introduced by the
underground economy.
44. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MONEY INCOME, supra note 38, at C-12, thl. C-1, provides the
percentages of independent estimates before and after the CPS imputes and edits the raw household data.
45. Id.
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